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Much of USDA conservation policy relies on voluntary, incentive-payment programs. These pro-
grams are designed to encourage farmers to undertake conservation efforts that address resource
concerns on their farms. However, to spend program dollars cost-effectively, program managers
must motivate farmers to offer to participate, then select those applicants who offer the greatest
environmental gain per dollar spent.
Bidding is one way to do that. Conservation program managers solicit contract offers (bids) from
farmers, and interested farmers compete for enrollment by submitting bids. Bids can convey criti-
cal information that program managers would not otherwise have, including who is willing to par-
ticipate, what land and practices they will offer, what resource concerns they are offering to
address, and the dollar amount they will accept to participate. When the cost to enroll all interest-
ed farmers exceeds available funding, bidding allows program managers to select the best appli-
cants by comparing contract offers—projected conservation benefits versus costs as submitted.
This ensures that final program participants are those who will maximize taxpayers’ investment in
conservation effort.ECONOMIC BRIEF Participant Bidding Enhances Cost Effectiveness
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Bidding Provides Information on Conservation Costs and Benefits
The bidding process is analogous to a homeowner who solicits construction bids. Different contractors
will likely propose offers that differ in terms of cost, expedience, quality, amenities, and durability. Based
on various financial constraints, zoning requirements, and architectural preferences, the homeowner will
weigh these offers and select the best fit. Similarly, a program manager might have a good idea of how
much a conservation practice might cost on average, but the likely environmental benefits provided and
which farmers will submit a bid for enrollment at a particular incentive rate are generally not known until
after program implementation.
In this situation, payments could be set at a fixed rate and contracts could be accepted until program funds
were exhausted (“first come, first served”). Or program managers could harness competition with a
signup that asks farmers to submit bids. Depending on the program, bids may specify what conservation
practices a farmer will install, on what land, at what price, and over what period. Different programs have
different rules about how bids are specified and weighted, but each bid generally includes information
about costs and benefits.
Costs –Farmers could “bid for cost,” or agree to accept a lower incentive payment for a given practice(s)
in hopes of being enrolled. However, accurate cost estimates for certain practices are elusive and time
consuming for both program managers and farmers.
Benefits –Farmers could “bid for benefits,” offering the practice(s) and field(s) that provide the greatest
(perceived) environmental benefit. When actual benefits are unknown, a proxy value (like the
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI)) can be used by program managers.
In a competitive program (one where the budget is not sufficient to enroll all interested participants), the
program manager could rank the bids according to costs, benefits, or both. To stretch the available budg-
et and to maximize environmental gain, the manager would favor contracts with the highest benefits rel-
ative to costs.
Bidding is Used in CRP and EQIP
Two prominent U.S. conservation programs have used flexible bidding rules to enroll the most cost-effec-
tive contracts. These are the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP, with a 2004 budget of $1.9 billion) and
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP, with a 2004 budget of $0.9 billion).
Conservation Reserve Program 
The CRP initially focused on retiring highly erodible cropland. Farmers often enrolled less productive
land and received annual payments above market rental rates for that land. Beginning in the early 1990s,
the USDA began selecting land for CRP enrollment based on the Environmental Benefits Index (USDA-
Farm Service Agency, 2004). The EBI accounts for offsite damages of soil erosion and recognizes other
environmental benefits, particularly wildlife habitat. EBI points are now assigned based on several envi-
ronmental categories and a cost factor. The majority of the EBI score is due to site-specific characteris-
tics (e.g., slope of the field, leaching potential of the soil, location in a wildlife priority area). Farmers
could therefore offer those fields for enrollment that have the highest site-specific scores (i.e., bidding for
benefits). Moreover, farmers could increase the attractiveness of their bids by agreeing to establish better
wildlife habitat, such as planting native grasses rather than domestic varieties. Farmers could also increase
the attractiveness of their bids by lowering the rental rate for their fields, known as “offering a discount”
(i.e., bidding for costs).
Program managers use both benefit and cost information to enroll the bids with the highest EBI score.
Between 1997 and 2003, farmers offering discounts had, on average, lower site-specific EBI scores than
those not offering discounts, suggesting that bidding for costs improved farmers chances of being
enrolled (table 1). However, the proportion of farmers offering a discount has declined over time, even
though the amount of the discount offered has generally increased.
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ing fields for enrollment that are inherently more attractive to program managers (i.e., bidding for bene-
fits) is becoming a more successful strategy. Fields enrolled from 1997 to 2003 had much higher site-spe-
cific scores than fields that were not enrolled, regardless of whether a discount was offered (table 1). Also,
fewer farmers may be offering discounts because program rental rates under CRP have been largely con-
stant since 1997, while market rental rates have increased, reducing landowners’ willingness to offer a fur-
ther discount.
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) 
Before 2002, EQIP applicants were able to both lower their request for program payments (bid for costs)
and offer a suite of conservation practices on selected fields (bid for benefits). During 1997-2001, broad
eligibility and modest funding ($200 million/year) resulted in a very competitive program. In 1997 and
1998, roughly 70 percent of EQIP applicants were rejected. Bids for cost-share rates (the reimbursement
rate requested by farmers for implementing conservation practices) were low relative to maximum allow-
able rates. For structural practices (e.g., animal waste handling systems or grassed waterways), farmers
could request up to 75 percent of the cost, but the mean accepted cost-share rate was only 35 percent.
For management practices (e.g., nutrient management, conservation tillage), producers could request up
to 100 percent of the (county) maximum incentive payment rate for the practice, but the mean accept-
ed cost-share rate was only 43 percent (table 2).
Some farmers requested lower cost-share rates because many structural/management practices funded by
EQIP produced private benefits. As such, even at the lower cost-share rates, farmers still broke even or
offset production costs that they would have borne anyway. For example, waste storage facilities may be
part of a livestock feeder’s plan for complying with local or State waste handling requirements. Sprinkler
irrigation systems that conserve water also reduce pumping costs. Pasture planting can improve grass
cover and reduce erosion, but will also increase grazing productivity. Similarly, conservation tillage, irriga-
tion water management, prescribed grazing, and nutrient management may reduce production costs
through careful management of production inputs.
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Table 1—Contract acres for CRP enrollment (1997–2003)
Acres  Share of Acres offered Mean Site-specific EBI
Year Signup (mil.) acres offered with discount discount  With discount W/o discount
Acres enrolled in CRP1:
1997 15 16.17 71% 57% 2.99 197 200
1997 16 5.92 65% 53% 6.68 198 209
1998 18 4.99 73% 36% 4.89 184 194
2000 20 2.46 73% 38% 5.80 183 194
2003 26 2.00 49% 31% 7.16 231 230
Acres offered, but not enrolled in CRP:
1997 15 6.49 29% 70% 5.01 153 155
1997 16 3.19 35% 48% 6.38 167 171
1998 18 1.81 27% 42% 5.67 153 161
2000 20 0.89 27% 41% 6.31 149 159
2003 26 2.06 51% 27% 6.49 181 181
Source: Economic Research Service analysis of CRP data.
1The site-specific EBI score measures the base environmental attributes of a candidate field and
does not account for proposed discounts or environmental enhancements.ECONOMIC BRIEF Participant Bidding Enhances Cost Effectiveness
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Strong competition among applicants may also have encouraged farmers to offer multiple practices on their
bid, thereby enhancing their environmental score. Subsequently, many proposed practices were never imple-
mented (which does not carry a penalty but does lessen the payment received). Between 1997 and 2001, 17
percent of EQIP contracts had one or more practice withdrawn (Cattaneo, 2003). Such behavior reduces
environmental gain from expected levels and may lower program cost effectiveness.
Modeling Bidding and Cost Effectiveness
Evidence from CRP and EQIP suggests that bidding for costs can help increase the cost effectiveness
of conservation programs—i.e., lowering the amount of financial assistance going toward farmers’
efforts to install and manage conservation practices. Similarly, evidence from CRP illustrates how bidding
for benefits can increase cost effectiveness by enrolling fields that provide greater environmental bene-
fits. By collecting cost and benefit information from farmers prior to enrollment, program managers can
maximize environmental benefits for a given conservation budget. Because there is little information
available to compare gains in cost-effectiveness via bidding versus nonbidding designs, two hypothetical
conservation programs (at different scales) help illustrate how program managers can use bidding to dis-
tribute conservation funds effectively.
Consider a conservation pro-
gram designed to encourage
farmers to use no-till residue
management (no-till) on crop-
land in a multicounty region.
No-till leaves a large percentage
of harvested crop residue on a
field in order to reduce the
amount of sediment and fertil-
izer runoff, enhancing nearby
water quality. Suppose this pro-
gram either offers participants a
flat rate for adopting no-till, or
solicits bids on the level of
financial assistance farmers
would be willing to accept
(WTA) to implement no-till. In
Evidence from CRP and
EQIP suggests that bid-
ding for costs can help
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Figure 1
Acres of no-till management
Table 2—EQIP best management/structural practices (1997–2001)
Selected management  Mean cost  Mean cost 
practices share rate (%) Selected structural practices share rate (%)
Conservation crop rotation 60 Waste storage facility 40
No-till/ Strip till 53 Fence 35
Mulch till 58 Sprinkler irrigation systems 42
Cover crop 27 Pasture/hay planting 45
Residue management 26 Pipeline (livestock water) 18
Irrigation water management 39 Irrigation water pipeline 42
Prescribed grazing 46 Brush management 29
Nutrient management 48 Grade stabilization structure 39
Pest management 45 Pond 38
All management practices 43 All structural practices 35
Source: Economic Research Service analysis of EQIP data.ECONOMIC BRIEF Participant Bidding Enhances Cost Effectiveness
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this example, suppose there are 100 farmers willing to adopt no-till on their 400-acre farms at an incen-
tive rate of $10 to $20 per acre, depending on individual farm conditions ($10 < _ WTA < _ $20). Line (F)
in fig. 1 represents the hypothetical distribution of farms and their WTA to adopt no-till. (In a real world
situation, it is likely that farms would not be distributed in such a uniform fashion along a straight line;
there would likely be many small farms and fewer large farms with different WTA.) 
If the program manager offered a flat payment of $20 per acre to any farmer willing to adopt no-till, the
noncompetitive program would be able to enroll all interested farmers. (Area A+B+C would represent
the total cost of such a program: $20 per acre × 40,000 acres = $800,000.) Yet, we know that many farm-
ers would have been willing to adopt no-till for less than $20 per acre. In this example, area (A) repre-
sents the amount of payments in excess of farmers’ WTA for adopting no-till. These excess payments
essentially support farm incomes (see Economic Brief No. 1).
Suppose now that the program manager has a limited budget of $500,000. Given a flat payment rate of $20
per acre to any producer willing to adopt no-till on their fields, enrollment on a first-come, first-served
entitlement basis would result in 63 farms and 25,000 acres being enrolled. As one alternative, the program
manager could offer the same $20 per acre and collect all the bids from farmers. Selecting those who bid for
the most benefits, the program manager could enroll those farms that would likely result in the greatest envi-
ronmental benefit for enrollment (e.g., farms on highly sloped lands or near water resources). The program
manager would still enroll 25,000 acres on 63 farms, but not necessarily the same farms as before.
Instead, suppose the program manager solicits bids from these same farmers, but asks them to indicate how
much they would be willing to accept to adopt no-till. The program manager could then select those who
bid for the lowest cost (with a cutoff of $10 per acre) and enroll up to 87 farms and 34,800 acres with no-till
for the same $500,000 budget (area B in figure 1). However, these acres might not necessarily generate the
same aggregate benefits as before.
In this example, a farmer’s probability of being accepted into a conservation program is heightened by
agreeing to accept lower payments to implement a conservation practice or by agreeing to enroll fields
likely to generate the greatest benefits from no-till residue management. In either case, the information
gathered by soliciting bids results in cost savings over a “first-come, first-served” approach.
Bidding for costs and benefits can also increase the cost effectiveness of a conservation program when
multiple regions and practices are involved. At a national level, farmers can improve the environmental
performance of their cropland (in response to incentive payments) using a broad slate of conservation
practices—nutrient management, no-till residue management, conservation rotations, etc. Using an empir-
ical model of U.S. agriculture and its environmental impacts, farmer responses to two types of program
designs (funded at $500 mil-
lion) are simulated: one that
allows bidding for benefits
only (using a fixed-rate incen-
tive payment) and one that
allows bidding for both bene-
fits and costs. Improvements
in environmental perform-
ance on farms are measured
in a number of ways (reduced
soil erosion, increased soil
productivity, etc.) and are rep-
resented in aggregate using
environmental points, similar
to the EBI. The simulations
suggest that farmers could
enhance environmental per-
formance on cropland by
At a national level, farm-
ers can improve the
environmental 
performance of their
cropland (in response to
incentive payments)
using a broad slate of
conservation practices.
Figure 2
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approximately 91 million points (or by 8.5 percent) if they were offered $5.50 per point and allowed to bid
for benefits (fig. 2). On the other hand, if farmers were asked to submit bids for both benefits and costs,
the program could generate the same environmental benefits at half the cost (about $250 million)—at an
average cost of $2.75 per point. At a funding level of $500 million, bidding for benefits and costs could
generate nearly 130 million benefit points (an average cost of $3.90 per point)—an increase in cost effec-
tiveness of about 30 percent when “bidding down” costs are allowed.
Practical Considerations
Many program design decisions will influence a program’s performance. For example, larger farms may
have lower average costs of installing practices than smaller farms, raising equity issues in selecting pro-
gram participants. Or certain farms may have greater potential to enhance wildlife habitat, whereas oth-
ers may be more suited to addressing water quality issues. Selecting bids for enrollment is difficult when
a program pursues multiple objectives (environmental or otherwise) that are not easily compared.
However, these considerations are generally important for voluntary conservation programs, with or
without bidding for costs and benefits.
In addition, the more flexible a program is regarding farmers’ choice of structural or management prac-
tices to bid for costs (lowering the amount of payment they require) and benefits (increasing the number
of practices eligible to generate environmental benefits), the more cost effective the program generally
will be. However, by allowing more flexibility, program managers will expend more time and effort in
developing estimates of the resulting environmental benefits and in providing technical assistance to inter-
ested farmers. Farmers will also have to spend more time estimating how much various practices will cost
to implement and which combination of practices on which fields will provide them the best chances for
enrollment. If these transaction costs are high, farmers may be reluctant to participate and/or program
managers may not have sufficient resources to select cost-effective contracts.
Bidding In Sum
For a program with limited funds, bidding provides program managers benefit and cost information to
select cost effective contracts, enables interested farmers to compete for enrollment, and can enhance cost
effectiveness. To maximize the advantages of bidding in conservation programs (i.e., to reduce program
costs and increase environmental benefits), both bidding for costs and bidding for benefits would need to
be included. In many cases, bidding for benefits is already in place. Farmers and program managers have
a good idea of which fields and which practices will generate the most benefits. Bidding for benefits is
already evident in State-level ranking procedures for EQIP contracts. Bidding for costs in EQIP was
discontinued in 2002 amid concerns about the ability of producers with limited financial resources to
compete effectively for EQIP enrollment. Aside from distributional concerns, however, bidding has
significant potential to increase the environmental cost effectiveness of conservation programs.
So it is bidding for costs, allowing farmers to submit the payment levels they would require under their
contract, that holds the most untapped potential for enhancing conservation program cost effectiveness.
If farmers compete for limited funds through such bidding, the cost effectiveness of the enrolled con-
tracts would be higher. Furthermore, the cost to program managers of determining the appropriate pay-
ment levels for eligible practices on participating farms would be much lower. The end result would be
more environmental gains for each conservation dollar spent.
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